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6.   Reflections from Northern Ireland on the 
Result of the UK Referendum on EU 
Membership 
Paul Carmichael1 
 
As the deluge subsides and the waters fall short, we 
see the dreary steeples of Fermanagh and Tyrone 
emerging once again. The integrity of their quarrel is 
one of the few institutions that have been unaltered in 
the cataclysm which has swept the world. 
Winston Churchill, 22 February 1922 
 
Written in the aftermath of the Great War, and the 
subsequent partition of Ireland as a prelude to the creation of 
the ‘Irish Free State’, Winston Churchill’s disparaging remarks 
have often been recalled in Northern Ireland, as the effects of 
later world events have been refracted through the prism of 
the Province’s politics. In this, the centenary year of the Battle 
of the Somme, although immeasurably less seismic in nature 
than that titanic struggle, the impact of the outcome of the 
United Kingdom’s recent referendum on European Union 
membership, continues to reverberate through the body 
politic of this Province, the UK as a whole, and indeed across 
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the rest of Europe. What will ‘Brexit’ mean for Northern 
Ireland? At this stage, with so much uncertainty, one can 
largely only speculate. However, while details remain elusive, 
it is clear that there are major implications and unintended 
consequences that flow from that momentous decision of 23 
June 2016. 
 
Background 
In the first ever pan-UK referendum, that on continued British 
membership of the European Economic Community (EEC) or 
‘Common Market’ in June 1975, Northern Ireland voted by 52 
per cent to 48 per cent to accept the revised terms that had 
been negotiated by the Labour Government. Nationally, the 
vote was 67 per cent in favour of remaining – the only parts of 
the entire UK to vote against, were the Western Isles and 
Shetland Islands. The result in Northern Ireland that year was: 
Yes 259,251 52.1% 
No 237,911 47.9% 
Turnout 48.2% 
In comparison, the rest of the UK endorsed staying in the EEC 
by a far greater margin. 
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Yes 17,378,581 67.2% 
No 8,470,073 32.8% 
Turnout 64.5% 
Nonetheless, there was some surprise that Northern Ireland 
had supported remaining in the Common Market. The 
Province’s Unionist majority, fearful that the EEC might 
undermine the already contested constitutional status of 
Northern Ireland, had been expected to back the ‘No’ 
campaign. The political leaders of Unionism were, on 
balance, against continued membership, some vehemently 
so, such as the Reverend Ian Paisley. Constitutional 
Nationalists were broadly in favour of continued membership 
although the Republican movement was hostile, contending 
that the ‘Rich Man’s’ or ‘Capitalist Club’ was anathema to 
their conception of Irish sovereignty and culture.  
In the years following the UK’s decision to remain in the EEC, 
and through successive Treaties which slowly but ineluctably 
bound both the UK and the Republic of Ireland ever more 
deeply into the European ‘project’, Northern Ireland was on 
balance a net beneficiary, at least as measured in terms of the 
financial largesse emanating from Brussels. Support for 
peace and conflict resolution in Northern Ireland, as 
demonstrated in successive financial packages to help 
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sustain that commitment, amounted to a sizeable addition to 
London-directed public spending. All told, now in fourth 
iteration, the Special Funds in support of peace in Northern 
Ireland have exceeded £1bn over several decades. That 
support was matched by the political goodwill of the 
European Union, championed by successive European 
Commission Presidents, to aid a reconciliation among the 
divided people of Northern Ireland. Evoking the imagery of 
the post-war Franco-German rapprochement, the EU was 
swift to dig deep into its pockets to resolve the continent’s 
most intractable civil conflict (at least until the strife that 
consumed Yugoslavia in 1992). Hence, while the rest of the 
UK has witnessed a steady growth in ‘Euroscepticism’, 
manifest in the rising popular vote of the United Kingdom 
Independence Party (UKIP) (if not matched in seats in 
Westminster), debate in Northern Ireland was more muted. 
Certainly, while immigration has been evident locally, its 
scale has not been comparable to that in much of England, 
where the issue acquired far greater political salience.  
The Referendum 
After the largely unanticipated return of a majority 
Conservative Government in the 2015 General Election, with 
its manifesto commitment to hold an ‘In/Out’ referendum on 
UK membership of the EU, the tenor of the debate was 
ratcheted up sharply. Overall, for most of the referendum 
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campaign, the terms of the debate in Northern Ireland over 
the UK’s continued membership of the European Union 
paralleled those elsewhere in the UK. Above all, in terms of 
the economic dimension of the issue, both the local Remain 
and Leave campaigns deployed many of the same arguments 
as their respective national counterparts, suitably nuanced to 
reflect the region’s particular geography – sharing the UK’s 
only land border with another EU Member State - and 
relatively depressed socio-economic conditions, having 
being particularly adversely affected by the impact of UK 
Government austerity by dint of the Province’s heavy reliance 
on public sector employment, related activity and welfare 
dependency. 
As the campaign opened, politically, Northern Ireland was 
predictably largely polarised, chiefly but not exclusively 
around the traditional fault lines that have characterised 
politics here since before its creation as a separate political 
entity. That is, the cleavage of ethno-national cum religious 
identity quickly determined the central division on the 
‘European question’. Perhaps nowhere but in Northern 
Ireland, could one see a biblical quotation in support of Leave 
adorning a gable end wall: “And I heard another voice from 
heaven, saying, Come out of her, my people, that ye not be 
partakers of her sins, and that ye receive not of her plagues.” 
(Book of Revelation Chapter 18, Verse 4) 
Hence, in the campaign, the demarcation was clear: the 
Nationalist parties (Sinn Fein and the Social & Democratic 
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Labour Party) were pro-Remain. For Sinn Fein, this 
represented a reversal of their stance in the 1970s since, 
among other factors, the party’s emergence as a party of 
Government in the North, and vying to be so in the South, 
meant that its all-Ireland credentials demanded nothing less 
than endorsement of the whole of Ireland to remain in the 
EU. Nationalists were joined by the bi-confessional Alliance 
Party of Northern Ireland and the smaller of the main 
Unionist parties, the Ulster Unionist Party, though there were 
notable detractors among its ranks, including former senior 
figures, from this official position. For Leave, the largest of 
the Unionist parties, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), 
was foremost in its calls for the UK to quit the EU. The DUP 
was joined by the smaller Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV) 
and the local arm of UKIP. 
Ultimately, therefore, the majority of the electorate in 
Northern Ireland behaved largely by reference to the issue 
which defines politics here, namely, the constitutional 
question and the border with the Republic of Ireland. 
Overwhelmingly, Nationalist voters heeded their political 
leaders, and plumped for the Remain argument. Conversely, 
Unionist voters heeded the advice of the largest political 
party, including the voice of the First Minister of Northern 
Ireland, Arlene Foster, and voted for the Leave campaign. 
Clearly, however, a significant minority of the Unionist 
electorate were sufficiently moved by the arguments to 
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‘break ranks’ and opt for Remain. Hence, the overall result in 
Northern Ireland was: 
Remain 440,437 55.8% 
Leave 349,442 44.2% 
(In 11 of Northern Ireland’s 18 Parliamentary constituencies, Remain 
prevailed) 
Turnout 62.7% 
In comparison, the rest of the UK endorsed leaving the EU 
by a far greater margin. 
Remain 
17,410,742 51.9% Leave 
16,141,241 48.1% 
Turnout 72.2% 
Matters Arising and Some Unfinished Business 
A string of ‘matters arising’ emanates from the referendum 
decision. As an issue, perhaps ‘the’ issue in Northern Ireland, 
‘the border’ displays three particular aspects both literally 
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and psychologically. Firstly, there is what sort of border? For 
supporters of EU membership, the prospect of a ‘hard’ border 
re-emerging between the two jurisdictions was very real. 
That there had never been a ‘wall’ or fence as such was 
overlooked. However, for much of the period following the 
creation of Northern Ireland as a separate political entity, its 
land border with the South was policed to varying degrees, 
including with military support during periods of terrorist 
insurgence (most notably during the Troubles 1969-1996), 
coupled with ‘normal’ customs officialdom monitoring cross-
border trade and movements. Hence, depending on the 
nature of the UK’s relationship with the rest of the EU after 
any secession, there has been much speculation as to 
whether customs controls would be reintroduced, and even 
an end to the passport and visa free movement associated 
with the Common Travel Area (CTA) which had been in 
operation since 1923 – save for the period from 1939 to 1952 
when, due to the national emergency of wartime conditions, 
cross border and indeed internal UK travel to/from Northern 
Ireland and Great Britain was restricted. Currently, the CTA 
involves an open borders arrangement that encompasses the 
Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, together with the British Crown 
dependencies of the Isle of Man, and the Channel Islands. 
Essentially, the CTA is based on legally non-binding 
arrangements, and its internal borders are subject to minimal 
or non-existent border controls whereby borders can usually 
be crossed by British and Irish citizens with minimal identity 
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documents, with certain exceptions. Necessarily, to function 
effectively, maintenance of the British Isles CTA involves 
considerable co-operation on immigration matters between 
the UK and Irish authorities. 
Certainly, many advocates of Remain contended that a Brexit 
would necessitate the imposition of new controls though at 
whose instigation such measures would be introduced was 
less clear – would these be by the British Government, eager 
to staunch a possible flow by the ‘back door’ or would they be 
by the Irish Government at the behest of the European Union, 
eager to protect the Single Market and its attendant 
imposition of customs duties. Interestingly, there were mixed 
messages from advocates of Leave. For some hard-line 
Unionists, the introduction of a ‘hard’ border between the 
North and South of Ireland, would be greeted with glee, 
predicated on the logic that ‘dissident republican terrorism 
remains undefeated’ and that only with the most stringent of 
security measures could the authorities hope to combat it 
effectively. The Chair of the Vote Leave campaign was Lord 
Lawson, a former Chancellor of the Exchequer during Mrs 
Thatcher’s Government, though who fell out with bitterly – 
ironically over matters European, namely, Sterling 
shadowing the Deutschmark as a prelude to membership of 
the Exchange Rate Mechanism of the European Monetary 
System in 1989. Lawson indicated that some controls 
appeared unavoidable, were the UK to leave the EU. For her 
part, Teresa Villiers, the Secretary of State for Northern 
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Ireland, and fellow Leave campaigner, rejected all such 
notions, saying effectively that it would be ‘business as usual’ 
as regards the border – at least from a British perspective. 
A second dimension to the border question concerns its 
location. Formally, of course, this is clear in international law, 
if sometimes less so to the naked eye in situ for it is a long and 
meandering line on the map, some 499 km (310 miles) in 
length, and punctuated with countless minor roads and 
byways – indeed, roads, farmsteads and even buildings sit 
astride it. In practice, both from a political and logistical 
perspective, attempting to establish a hard border would be 
both costly and highly contentious. Perhaps the controversy 
which any reinstatement might occasion would be equalled 
only by the rumpus that would ensue, were the UK 
Government to adopt an internal hard border at Northern 
Ireland’s air and seaports for transit to and from Great Britain. 
Such a step would be anathema for Unionists. Quite apart 
from the added inconvenience such measures which 
necessarily entail for intra-UK travel, and the sense it would 
diminish their sense of Britishness in some way, the signal 
this would send to the Province – being interpreted as 
confirming Northern Ireland’s pariah status within the UK – 
would be loud and clear.  
In the words of one of the most celebrated Irish historians, 
James Camlin Beckett, the third dimension to the border 
question concerns ‘the border in the mind’. That is, amid the 
regular and sometimes violent clash of identities – 
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Protestant, Catholic, British, Irish, Northern Irish, Unionist, 
Nationalist, Loyalist, Republican – in Northern Ireland, what 
does the idea of Europe mean and what actual difference 
does it make? Specifically, as given expression in its nascent 
political cum governmental entity known first as a European 
Community, latterly post-Maastricht, as a European Union, 
Europe offered a form of sanctuary in which ancient and 
bitter enmities might be safely parked. Ever since both the 
UK and Republic of Ireland acceded to the Treaty of Rome in 
1972, at the height of the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland, there 
has been a substantial body of opinion among academics, 
politicians, advisers, policy makers and other commentators 
that both states’ subsequent shared membership of the 
Common Market provided a neutral space in which their 
intergovernmental relationship and efforts to find a solution 
to political and communal strife in Northern Ireland might 
bear fruit. In many ways, the Good Friday or Belfast 
Agreement of 1998 effectively removed the border from 
Northern Ireland politics and the immediate calculations and 
actions of its politicians. The agreement ensured the border 
was ‘detoxified’ as a potent issue bedevilling each and every 
move of the politicians. With Brexit, will atavistic tendencies, 
perhaps prematurely thought to have been safely diffused, or 
at least rendered largely impotent, be reignited? In truth, few 
locally speak with much affection or enthusiasm for their 
European identity but the ‘fact of Europe’ did at least afford a 
sense that one could possess several indeed multiple 
identities, and not feel threatened, effectively rendering the 
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border of 1921 as little more than a line on the map, and a 
slowly dissolving one at that. 
To all of these points must be added a further consideration. 
The status quo ante of British-Irish relations and identities 
pre-1973 is out of reach even if it were thought desirable. For 
its part, ‘Irish identity’ as enunciated through the organs of 
the Irish State and other key stakeholders and opinion 
formers such as the media in the Republic of Ireland have, in 
key respects, morphed in their acknowledgement that ‘being 
Irish and/or of Ireland’ meant more than exclusively being 
‘Catholic, Republican, and Insular’. Likewise, what might one 
say of British identity? Necessarily more complex than its 
Irish counterpart, given it encompasses several nations and a 
much larger and more diverse population, British identity has 
changed even more dramatically. Moreover, in Great 
Britain’s most restless corner, that of Scotland, a resurgent 
and distinct Scottish identity has been evident. It is 
increasingly alien from and indeed often hostile to that 
overarching sense of Britishness and has been given an 
enormous fillip by the albeit failed attempt at securing 
secession in the independence referendum of September 
2014 and, most recently, by the decisive vote in every 
electoral district of Scotland, in favour of remaining in the EU. 
Amid the renewed clamour in several quarters for the voters’ 
appetite for Scottish independence to be re-tested through a 
second plebiscite, as a means of safeguarding a continued or 
renewed Scottish representation in the EU, were such calls to 
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be heeded and the separatists to prevail in their intent, then 
what is left of Britishness? 
That family of nations in the United Kingdom, that British 
Union, cementing England, Wales, Northern Ireland and 
Scotland would be torn asunder – arguably a disaster all 
round but a truly cataclysmic prospect for those of avowedly 
British identity in the Province of Northern Ireland, who well 
may be left asking ‘still loyal, but to what?’, if the entity to 
which they cleave so strongly, is itself left broken. Certainly, 
Northern Ireland’s Unionists would remain unswervingly 
loyal to the British Crown and Union, whatever residual 
territorial entity (dubbed ‘rest of UK’ or ‘rUK’) that might 
survive a Scottish secession. However, the risk is that such 
professed continuing devotion to the Union would be an 
unrequited love, with England becoming increasingly weary 
of a restless Celtic fringe. What then the prospects for peace 
and stability in Northern Ireland? Even after twenty years of 
relative quiescence following the cessation of the ‘Troubles’, 
there remains a sense in which peace in Northern Ireland is 
rather too conditional, with little being needed to re-ignite 
dormant enmities. Hence, might Scotland’s breakaway be 
the touchpaper for a resumption of political violence in 
Ireland? 
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Other issues 
The referendum and the prospect of UK secession from the 
EU has also raised other questions. In common with its 
national counterpart in Whitehall, it is now clear that the 
devolved governmental machine at Stormont was woefully 
unprepared for what has come to pass. Yet, there are key 
issues that remain to be resolved and the role or scope for the 
devolved Government to influence and shape. 
First, in a region where a large proportion of the population 
remains heavily dependent on farming, the issue of how 
agriculture and fisheries will fare is prominent. Given the 
structural composition of the EU budget, Northern Ireland 
has been a major net beneficiary of farm support payments 
under the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP).  In short, what 
regulatory and subsidies regime, if any, will be introduced 
if/when CAP and the Common Fisheries Policy no longer 
apply in Northern Ireland. Will the UK simply adopt a ‘cut and 
paste’ UK-version of CAP, at least to maintain the current 
subsidy regime and levels for a transition period? Will it revert 
to the old post-war deficiency payments system of income 
subsidies and price supports? And, whatever eventuates, will 
there be a devolved dimension to the arrangements allowing 
regional priorities and conditions to be taken into 
consideration by locally elected politicians? 
Second, in common with universities throughout the UK, 
there are major implications for the higher education sector 
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in Northern Ireland in relation to university research funding 
(Horizon 2020) and exchange programmes (such as 
Erasmus), as well as for the level of fees. While there have 
been calls for ‘business as usual’ and assurances that existing 
arrangements will be honoured, alarm has greeted the 
prospect of UK universities being locked out of a lucrative 
source of alternative research funds at a time when they are 
already facing financial stress. Moreover, even if mechanisms 
can be engineered to afford continued access to such funds, 
there is a fear that the levels of engagement in crucial 
research networks might be compromised by Brexit, not to 
mention rendering the UK a less attractive proposition for 
highly mobile and talented academics. 
Third, the nature of North-South Cooperation in Ireland will 
be altered dramatically by Brexit. To that end, Enda Kenny, 
the Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland, together with a 
swathe of mainly Nationalist politicians in Northern Ireland, 
has called for an all-Ireland forum to consider how best to 
manage the implications of Brexit. In response, Arlene 
Foster, the First Minister in Northern Ireland, has declared 
emphatically ‘no’ to the convening of an all-Ireland Brexit 
forum while the Deputy First Minister, Martin McGuinness, 
has said that a failure to do so could once again threaten the 
stability and continuity of the devolved arrangements, so 
painstakingly put back on track after several earlier episodes 
of trauma. By way of overcoming the impasse, it has been 
suggested that this role could be subsumed within the remit 
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of the existing North-South Ministerial Council, one strand of 
the three-stranded Belfast Agreement ‘confederal’ 
architecture that spans the British Isles, long viewed as a fig 
leaf for Northern Nationalists devoid of serious business or 
responsibility, but now suddenly in a pivotal role. Whatever 
the format for such intergovernmental negotiations, 
Stormont and Dublin might do well to agree on the nature of 
the border, henceforth. On the thorny issue of passport 
controls, while neither country is signatory to the Schengen 
Accord, neither has any appetite for introducing such 
controls. For these reasons among others, it will be important 
that representatives of the devolved Government along with 
their counterparts from Scotland and Wales are included in 
UK level deliberations over the country’s negotiating stance 
with the EU, once Article 50 is invoked. 
Fourth, long before the referendum, the devolved 
Government in Northern Ireland has been exploring the 
scope to secure a further measure of fiscal devolution, 
specifically, via variation in corporation tax. Under the 
‘Azores ruling’ by the European Court of Justice in 2006, on 
the scope and nature of variation in corporation taxation 
within Member States, Northern Ireland had pursued the 
option to lower corporation tax to equal the effective 
equivalent rate in the Republic of Ireland (12.5 per cent), 
commencing April 2018. It had been through tortuous 
negotiations with the UK Treasury to conclude the terms for 
the devolution of this key fiscal lever. However, the recent 
98 
 
cuts in the UK national rate of corporation tax (to 20 per cent, 
and due to fall further by 2020), it means that the competitive 
edge sought from a locally funded lower rate of corporation 
tax will be substantially blunted, though it would, at least, 
imply the earmarked funds to pay for such a reduction can 
now be wired into one or more of the many other deserving 
causes within Government. If not the whole UK, then could 
Northern Ireland experience a ‘soft’ Brexit, and remain as part 
of the EU’s Single Market – possibly along with Scotland – 
while the bulk of the UK remains outside? Ostensibly, the 
answer is no. However, while there is no precedent for such 
an outcome, there is no precedent for Brexit either. The EU 
will share the desire of both the UK and Irish Governments to 
avoid artificial distortions of trade and commerce on the 
island of Ireland. Moreover, in a post-Brexit scenario, 
depending on the nature of renegotiated terms of trade that 
might eventuate, does EU competition policy and other rules 
on state aid no longer apply or at least with the same force, 
thereby allowing Westminster to channel compensating 
funds to depressed areas. Again, Brussels will want to avoid a 
Dutch auction of beggar thy neighbour fiscal competition and 
any attendant downward pressure on national tax receipts. 
Similarly, given Northern Ireland has not experienced the 
intensity of the pressures of mass immigration experienced in 
England, there is also a concern around staff shortages in key 
sectors of the economy and public services, chief among 
which is the health service. 
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A fifth issue concerns the fate of EU legislation on the UK 
statute book and the process of untangling what has become 
a complex of legal provisions. That is, how much, if any, will 
remain, be scrapped or be amended and what role, if any, will 
be afforded to devolved fora such as the Northern Ireland 
Assembly (let alone local government)? Although references 
to subsidiarity have largely disappeared from the political 
discourse around the appropriate interface of European and 
national law making, the concept remains highly pertinent in 
the context of UK secession from Europe. With the very 
future integrity of the UK again in question, given popular 
attitudes in Scotland, a measure of flexibility and 
magnanimity on the part of London towards its restless 
territorial estate may well be both politically expedient and 
necessary if the fissiparous pressures of secession are not to 
prove irresistible. 
Assuming Brexit occurs, there has been much speculation 
around the possibility of contagion effects for neighbouring 
countries. In short, will others seek to follow suit, where the 
UK has plotted a new course? For the Republic of Ireland, 
there appears little enthusiasm to join the UK in heading for 
the exit. However, British secession does present the Irish 
Republic with positive opportunities as the sole English-
speaking country in the EU. Although the Celtic Tiger roars 
no more, Ireland’s bounce back from the nadir of the 2008 
financial crisis has still been remarkable, particularly in 
contrast to its more troubled southern European 
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counterparts. Will it, therefore, exploit its position as the new 
‘lynchpin’ between the EU and North America? Conversely, 
will any such gains be offset by adverse currency and banking 
sector developments vis-à-vis Ireland’s largest market, the 
UK? Cross-border trade, especially if Sterling remains 
depressed relative to the Euro, will occasion a dramatic net 
flow northwards. Similar conditions previously in 2009 had a 
crippling effect on border businesses and the Irish Exchequer, 
notably from depressed VAT receipts, when Sterling was last 
at near parity with the Euro. For Northern Ireland’s exporters, 
that same currency movement offers a potential boon, both 
into the EU as well as further afield. Whether they will then 
be able to exploit it remains to be seen. 
 
Outlook 
The outcome of the UK’s referendum on continued 
membership of the European Union has delivered a decisive 
message. While the details of how and when or even if any 
secession takes effect, and the nature of the subsequent UK-
EU relationship, remain to be determined, the implications 
for the whole country will be profound. For Northern Ireland, 
with its land border adjoining the Republic of Ireland, the 
impact of Brexit will have greater ramifications. It will be in 
the interests of both parts of Ireland, North and South, and 
their respective sovereign governments, to explore how best 
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to mediate their relationship in the new dispensation, to 
mutual advantage. 
 
Endnote 
1. I am grateful to Professor Arthur Aughey, Emeritus 
Professor, Ulster University, for his helpful advice in advance 
of the preparation of this paper. 
  
